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Abstract 
 
This article examines the connection between program evaluation research and decision-
making by public managers. Drawing on neo-institutional theory, a framework is presented 
for diagnosing the pressures and conditions that lead alternatively toward or away the 
rational use of evaluation research. Three cases of public-nonprofit contracting for the 
delivery of major programs are presented to clarify the way coercive, mimetic, and normative 
pressures interfere with a sound connection being made between research and 
implementation. The article concludes by considering how public managers can respond to 
the isomorphic pressures in their environment that make it hard to act on data relating to 
program performance.  
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A critical part of the effort to make the link between policy analysis and public 
management has long centered on understanding and documenting “what works,” an 
approach logically reserved for successful interventions with proven track-records. As a 
consequence, the task of policy analysts and program evaluators has often involved the 
difficult and unglamorous work of ferreting out from the vast haystack of interventions those 
few programs demonstrating the greatest probability of producing significant impact (Rossi, 
Freeman, Lipsey 1999; Weiss 1972). When this information is made public and disseminated 
across the field, public managers analyze it and react accordingly. Armed with good data on 
programs with proven performance, public managers should -- in theory, at least -- be able to 
speed the replication of successful programs (Shore 1997). 
Connecting evaluation research to public decision making has taken on a new 
dimension as the work of public management has been transformed over the past three 
decades by the rise of service contracting, which has shifted responsibility for the delivery of 
public programs to non-governmental organizations. Many responsibilities have been pushed 
down to more local levels of government through devolution (Donahue 1997) and out to 
nonprofit service providers through privatization (Donahue 1989; Milward and Provan 1993; 
Kramer 1981). As this movement “down and out” has swept through government, the task of 
collecting and acting on evaluation data has changed. Rather than focus on government 
exclusively, researchers have been forced to examine new models of service delivery that 
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increasingly look to nonprofit organizations as prime vehicles for implementation. In this 
sense, the target of research has been broadened by the changing character of governance. 
Evaluation research focused on the performance of outside contractors can and should help 
public officials, sometime in multiple localities, make difficult contracting decisions more 
soundly, learn about programs implemented in other areas, and avoid funding efforts that 
others have learned do not work.  
In principle, this model of how evaluation research can be used to improve public 
management and contracting is sound and reasonable. It is grounded in a rationalist 
perspective that seems more than just plausible. Evidence that a particular initiative or 
program has positive effects can and should fuel replication and expansion, assuming that the 
needs that are met by a program are widespread and common. Conversely, evidence that an 
intervention does not achieve its intended objectives should lead to its abandonment, and the 
search for alternative forms of service delivery.  
In practice, however, public managers have had trouble replicating what works and, 
in at least a few notable cases, have devoted large amounts of public funds into programs that 
evaluation research has shown do not work or for which there is no evidence of either 
success or failure. This paper attempts to bring a neglected strand organization theory to bear 
on the questions of how and why public managers contract with outside vendors for the 
delivery of programs that they know, or should know, are not effective based on existing 
evaluation research. We are interested in developing a framework for thinking about the 
institutional factors that may override the impact of evaluation research and drive flawed 
contracting decisions.  
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In carrying such a project, it might be tempting to fall into the trap of singling out and 
blaming a few individual managers for exercising poor judgment. This is not the approach 
taken here. Instead, we attempt to develop a framework for understanding what might 
actually lead managers to spend scarce program funds on efforts that have a very low 
likelihood of success. To carry out this delicate task, we draw on a branch of organization 
theory that has come to be known as neo-institutionalism (Dimaggio and Powell 1991; 
Meyer and Rowan 1991; Scott 1991 & 1998; Zucker 1987) – an approach to organizations 
that yet to penetrate very deeply into the literature of public administration. By outlining the 
relevant parts of institutional theory and by bringing them into contact with public 
administration theory, we hope to both expand the repertoire of explanations of public sector 
decision-making and to shed some light on the difficult question of why failure are so hard to 
avoid replicating even in the face of ample evidence. To be sure, the literature of public 
administration has advanced several explanations for ineffective administration. Bureaucratic 
inertia, budgetary politics, the emergence of standard operating principles, and other 
traditional administrative challenges may well impinge on a public manager’s ability to 
execute effectively. What we suggest here, however, is that it may possible to step outside 
this literature into organizational sociology to locate a different and potentially useful 
framework for thinking about the issue of failed contracting efforts. 
The paper proceeds in three main steps. In a first section we sketch some background 
on public-nonprofit contracting, present the key elements of the institutional perspective on 
organizations and its implications for public sector contracting. In a second section, we 
present a framework for thinking about the intersection of evaluation research and 
institutional theory and apply this framework to three cases. We conclude in a final section 
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with some advice for public managers about how to maximize the contribution of evaluation 
research and how to minimize the influence of institutional pressures. 
 
I. Contracting Amidst Institutional Pressures 
Over the past three decades, the growing reliance of federal, state and local 
governments on service contracting has changed the shape and scope of the public sector. 
Some have termed this shift to outside providers the rise of “third-party government” 
(Salamon 1991) while others have named it the “hollow state” (Milward and Provan 
1993).  No matter what it is called, the growth of public-private contractual relations has 
profoundly shaped the work of governance. As public managers have increasingly 
contracted with outside parties for work for work that had long been reserved for the 
public sector itself (Boris and Steuerle, 1999;Gronbjerg 1991; Wolch 1990), program 
evaluation and performance management have emerged as ever more critical functions of 
government (Abramson & Kamensky 2001, Newcomer 1996, Weiss 1972). The use of 
outside contractors requires that great care be given to the selection, oversight, and 
funding of these private entities charged with carrying out public purposes.  
Government has progressively shifted much of the responsibility for the delivery 
of vital human services to nonprofit and for-profit because these organizations appear to 
be effective vehicles for the fulfillment of public purposes. Nonprofits have many 
perceived advantages, including being more innovative, flexible, and responsive to the 
needs of local communities (Light 2000; Lohman 1992; O’Neill 1989). The growth of 
for-profit human service providers, particularly in the fields of job-training and elder 
care, has held out the promise that contracting might even lead to substantial cost savings, 
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as services are delivered by firms with a bottom line. As a result, contracting out has 
become a critical managerial option for government at all levels, one that promises to 
maintain quality and reduce costs, thereby satisfying both service recipients and 
taxpayers (DeHoog 1985 & 1990; Ferris 1993; Smith and Lipsky 1995).  
While imposing oversight demands, the ability to bring in outside contractors has 
the important characteristic of lowering the barrier to entry in many fields. Instead of 
mobilizing internal capacity, public managers are able to draw on existing group of 
organizations to implement new initiative often far more quickly and broadly than would 
other wise be possible. The speed and breadth of implementation that contracting brings 
with it raises a simple but important question: How can public managers ensure that the 
programs they contract for are likely to produce valuable social benefits? The answer lies 
in part in the strategic use of existing evaluation research. Public managers are able to 
inform decisions about what kinds of programs to implement by drawing on evaluation 
data of similar efforts that have been implemented in other localities.  
Many factors determine the ultimate impact of evaluation data in government. 
Beyond who has conducted the evaluation (e.g. agency staff, external evaluators, 
independent auditors), and what kind of evaluation has been carried out (e.g. process 
evaluation or impact evaluation), other factors that influence the capacity of evaluation 
research to shape action include the political context within which the evaluation is 
received (e.g. level of legislative or executive activism and degree of political turbulence 
and dissatisfaction), who requested the evaluation and how open they are to accepting its 
implications (e.g. legislators, agency head, program manager, executive officials, budget 
officers), and the ultimate quality of the dissemination effort (e.g. its breadth, depth, and 
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accessibility) (Newcomer 1996). All these factors must be weighed when both designing 
and then seeking to implement ideas and recommendations that emerge from evaluation 
research. 
While there is very good reason that one might expect to find the active and 
frequent use of evaluation data in contracting decisions, there is a fair amount of 
evidence, based on case studies over the years, that evaluation research is either ignored 
or not sought when important government decisions are made. The literature of public 
administration has hardly been silent on the issue of the missing link between analysis or 
evaluation and practice. Over the decades, several important branches of public 
administration theory have advanced explanations for why public managers often are 
unable to use information to improve decision making and performance.  Early theories 
of bureaucratic politics, for example, emphasized that the budgetary process can lead to 
perverse decisions and make rational planning impossible (Wildavsky 1964). The 
inability of government agencies to free themselves from political and budgetary pressure 
can lead to the triumph of incrementalism (Lindblom 1965), and the inability to make 
significant changes in direction. Other classics have focused on the phenomenon of 
bureaucratic inertia, in which a vicious circle emerges that pushes public agencies toward 
ever greater levels of impersonality and centralization of decision making. Bureaucratic 
forms act as shields that allow for less personal interaction among workers. Once 
personal connections are severed, rules and procedures are put in place to stop individuals 
from seeking to act alone to solve few remaining areas where rules to do not apply. 
Crozier (1964) aptly noted that a bureaucracy is “an organization which cannot correct its 
behavior by learning from its errors.” 
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Although explanations based on bureaucratic politics and inertia help us to 
understand the context within which the connection between analysis and action can 
break down in government, a more comprehensive model in needed that integrates both 
the pressures from the environment and the behavior of individuals within organizations. 
This model can be found in the new institutionalism in organizational analysis. While it 
has not been widely embraced by public administration researchers, the new 
institutionalism has made a significant contribution to organizational sociology. 
Institutionalism has managed move the focus of research from explaining why 
organizations within common fields are so different from one another to why 
organizations in reality are so similar in form. Institutionalism greatest influence has been 
felt in the move it encouraged away from rational action (Coleman 199X) explanations of 
organizational behavior toward approaches that recognize that organizations are situated 
in cultural and political contexts. 
Over the past decade, institutional research has generated empirical studies on all 
kinds of organizations, including ones in the nonprofit, business and government sectors. 
In the area of nonprofits, researchers have focused on organizations as diverse as art 
museums (DiMaggio, 1991), colleges and universities (Brint and Karabel, 1991), 
humanitarian groups (Christiansen and Molin, 1995), and professional  associations 
(Halliday, 1993). The relevance of the institutional approach to business firms has also 
been demonstrated in a set of studies spanning many different fields of business 
(Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Davis and Greve, 1997; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 
1989, Holm, 1995; Suchman, 1995; Powell, 1998). To a far more limited extent, studies 
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have emerged of how institutional pressures shape public sector organizations (Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1983; Meyer, Scott, and Strang,1987; Meyer et al 1988.).  
 In addition to its breadth of substantive focus across sectors, the new 
institutionalism in organizational analysis accommodates a range of theoretical, 
methodological, and substantive interests (Scott 1991 & 1995).  While much work has 
been done to sort out and classify the many strands of institutional research, the theory 
remains more of an orientation than a well-ordered, rigorous theory. Differences among 
institutional arguments are considerable, but a few central issues and themes do unite the 
approach. Early statements of the theory emphasized the symbolic and ceremonial 
transformation that organizations undergo, changes that reflect myths in the institutional 
environment rather than a detached calculus of costs and benefits (Meyer and Rowan, 
1991).  Other early work focused on processes such as isomorphic transformation 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 1983), contradictions (Friedland and Alford, 1991), persistence 
(Zucker, 1988, 1991), diffusion (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983), and institutionalization 
(Scott, 1991, 1994, 1995).   
In its most basic terms, the new institutionalism has attempted to overcome the 
old assumption that an organization’s internal structure efficiently matches its function 
or mission (Meyer and Rowan 1991). In the place of this rationalist assumption, the new 
institutionalism offers a view of organizations in which structure is loosely coupled with 
work activity, where roles, myths, and ceremonies emerge and spread within fields of 
activity. Organizations are longer conceived as pioneering innovators and efficiency 
maximizers, but instead as legitimacy-seeking conformists that regularly look around 
their field and borrow practices from other similar organizations. By adopting forms and 
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routines that appear to work or that are at least popular, organizations slowly gravitate 
towards structural homogeneity or what institutionalists call institutional isomorphism.  
 In an early and important statement of the theory, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
spell out the nature of the pressures exerted on organizations that can lead to 
breakdowns in rationality, decoupling of structure and action, and heighten levels of 
convergence. They identified three forces driving institutionalization: (1) coercive 
isomorphism that stems from political influence and the need for legitimacy; (2) mimetic 
isomorphism resulting from standard responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative 
isomorphism associated with professionalization. DiMaggio and Powell emphasize that 
these three mechanisms can overlap and intermingle, but they tend to derive from 
different conditions. At an analytic level, only coercive isomorphism is linked to the 
environment surrounding the organizational field. Mimetic and normative processes are 
internal to the field and help explain the spread of roles and structures.   In their early 
theoretical statement, DiMaggio and Powell argue that when organizations are subjected 
to outside coercive scrutiny, accounting, and regulation, they tend to react defensively 
and gravitate toward isomorphic transformation. As the pressures from the outside grow, 
organizations are led to find ways to either diffuse or eliminate this pressure by changing 
their practices. One of the easiest ways to change is to adopt those routines and 
structures that are defined by law or government agencies as legitimate. To do so may 
ensure survival by minimizing conflict. 
 It is ultimately possible to recover within this work and the broader literature of 
institutional theory a useful way of thinking about the pressures that shape public 
organizations. For the purposes of this argument, it is important to note that institutional 
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theory changes fairly significantly the terms of the discussion of why contracting 
decisions are sometimes made in the public sector that do not always represent a full 
appreciation of all the facts that might be pertinent. Institutional theory brings the 
political environment into the analysis, as well as the pressures that come from peer and 
professional networks to explain the tendency of public sector organizations to converge 
on models of service delivery – with or without evidentiary support. Our claim is that 
the triad of coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism represents a useful but largely 
untapped diagnostic device for understanding the context of public sector management 
and decision making. In the next section, we attempt to apply these concepts to three 
cases of government contracting. 
 
II.  Institutional Pressures, Evaluations, and Contracting Decisions: Three Cases 
Having both sketched some of the issues related to use of evaluation data in 
contracting and the central claims of institutional theory, it is useful to consider the 
contracting decision as the intersection of these two very different dimensions and to 
build a simple matrix using these two dimensions: The first dimension is the level of 
evaluation research available to contractors and the range of evaluation data that can be  
part of the contract decision making process. The second dimension is the level of 
institutional pressure that managers are subject to in their work. It is possible to envision 
a continuum of institutional forces bearing on public managers, ranging from very low 
levels of institutional pressure to very high levels, and a range in the quality and extent of 
evaluation data across various fields. By connect these two dimensions, it is possible to 
construct four generic scenarios (Figure 1).  
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The first situation is one where the amount of institutional pressure is high but 
where there is a paucity of good evaluation research. Under such circumstances, 
programs may be replicated prematurely, as managers feel pressure to act, even in the 
absence of good data and information. The second scenario is one where institutional 
pressures are high and were there is abundant evaluation research.  This is a situation in 
which public managers may rely on strong inter-organizational networks to share 
information and where data appears to argue to for the swift diffusion of service models 
across a field, especially if there is public support for action in response to the underlying 
issue or social problem.  The third scenario is one in which low levels of institutional 
pressure coincide with low levels of evaluation data. In cases where the impetus for 
change is low and where data supporting particular forms of action are not readily 
available, incremental expansion of programs may occur, sometimes just because funds 
are available. The fourth scenario is one in which institutional pressures are relatively low 
and where evaluation data is abundant. In this situation, public managers may be largely 
free from institutional pressures, able to ground their decisions in relevant data, and 
fashion strategically a set of programmatic activities that have a higher than normal 
likelihood of success. 
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ubstance abuse by exposing youth to the dangers of drug and 
a curriculum delivered by police officers, teachers, and parents.  
s target 5th and 6th graders, although the program has been 
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expanded to include younger and older students. In DARE’s initial year (1983-84), 10 
police officers taught the curriculum to approximately 8,000 students in 50 elementary 
schools. Over the past 17 years, DARE has been expanded and implemented in over 
8,000 cities across the nation, reaching 35 million students a year in more than 80 percent 
of U.S. school districts. The program has also been exported to Japan, Vietnam, and 
Brazil, among other countries. 
Initially, DARE was developed as a pilot program by the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) against the backdrop of the emergence and spread of crack cocaine. 
Given the strong tendency of crack users to engage in criminal activity to support their 
habit, the LAPD began searching for strategies that would prevent drug use and 
subsequent criminal activity.  These efforts resulted in the DARE program. DARE’s 
curricula is designed to teach students to recognize pressures to use drugs from peers and 
from the media, teach students the skills to resist peer inducements to use drugs, enhance 
students’ self esteem, teach positive alternatives to substance use, and increase students’ 
interpersonal communication and decision-making skills.  Across the nation, DARE’s 
classroom material is standardized and does not vary substantially from school to school.  
This curriculum is taught over the course of 17 hour-long weekly sessions.  DARE police 
officers are primarily responsible for delivering the instruction with the assistance of 
teachers.  A variety of teaching strategies are used, including the presentation of facts, 
group discussions, role-playing, and workbook exercises. 
The growth and evolution of this program followed the passage of the Drug-Free 
Schools and Communities Act (DFSCA) of 1986.  DFSCA provides money to States, 
schools, and communities to develop and expand drug prevention programs.  Funded at 
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approximately $500 million per year, school corporations must implement a 
comprehensive drug prevention program in order to be eligible to receive DFSCA 
funding.  A substantial number of schools have turned to DARE as a means to meet these 
eligibility criteria.  DFSCA money is also used to support the implementation of 
substance abuse prevention programs, such as DARE.  It is important to note that local 
support for DARE occurred at the same time this program was endorsed by numerous 
federal government agencies involved in the support of schools and the war on drugs, 
including the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the National Park 
Service, and the Department of Defense.  These government endorsements created 
immense coercive pressure on local school corporations to adopt the DARE program. 
Even though DARE had only been in operation for a short time, the program was 
quickly labeled a model in the field of drug use prevention even though there was no 
valid and reliable evidence to suggest these perceptions were accurate.  Local officials 
interested in accessing federal money were quick to identify existing programs that would 
allow them to access additional resources.  DARE was visible, well marketed, and tacitly 
endorsed by “experts” in the field and government agencies. Moreover, DARE soon 
became identified as an important component of the war on drugs and the “just say no” 
campaign.  This linkage was fostered as a constellation of political and civic leaders, as 
well as educational and criminal justice professionals, sought strategies that would 
symbolically endorse the drug war, while aligning these various spheres of public life 
with this campaign.  In short, support for DARE became support for the drug war, and 
conversely opposition to DARE represented opposition or at least lack of commitment to 
the drug war.  This intense normative pressure, combined with the strong arm of 
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government endorsement, put DARE on a fast track for widespread diffusion.  School 
districts and local police departments across the nation were quick to copy the Los 
Angeles model.  During the early years, skepticism about the program’s impact was rare.  
Local officials acted on blind faith, unfolding a standardized DARE program in 
community after community – with little or no attention to whether drug use was even a 
problem in a particular community. 
Today, DARE is a centrally controlled and administered.  DARE America, a not-
for-profit organization, is responsible for implementing and managing the program at the 
national level.  This organization is assisted by an advisory board of experts and 
advocates in the field of substance abuse prevention.  DARE’s organizational 
infrastructure also includes state-level commissions that are responsible for coordinating 
and promoting substance abuse prevention programs within each state. Across the nation, 
DARE has received wide spread public support by forging close partnerships between 
local schools, law enforcement, and the non-profit sector.  These partnerships have 
fostered a web of organizations and institutions across the nation around the issue of drug 
use prevention.  For these actors, DARE provides financial resources, media attention, 
and legitimacy as allies in the war on drugs.  In short, DARE and its administrative 
apparatus has embedded once disparate actors from various parts of the social structure 
into a complex network of organizations that have an interest in the continued operation 
of this program. 
At the time DARE was replicated across the country, no valid empirical evidence 
existed that tested the program’s impact.  Local political decision makers did not really 
care whether DARE worked.  It was more important to implement DARE, sending a 
  17
signal to government funding agencies, parents, and other interested parties, that schools 
and their administrators were allies in the drug war.  Demonstrating this shared 
normative belief by replicating DARE was perhaps more important to local political 
decision makers than whether or not DARE actually reduced drug use. Since its initial 
implementation and widespread adoption across the nation, a substantial research 
literature has emerged assessing DARE’s impact.  Overall, evaluations of DARE have 
consistently found the program to be ineffective at reducing drug use.  Recent research 
using longitudinal data, tracking drug use among randomly selected DARE participants 
in comparison to those participants who received a standard drug education curriculum, 
has found that the program does not reduce drug use (Lynam, et al, 1999).  These 
researchers conclude that “[f]ew differences were found between the 2 groups in terms 
of actual drug use, drug attitudes, or self-esteem, and in no case did the DARE group 
have a more successful outcome than the comparison group” (1999:590).   
Meta-analysis of eight rigorous quantitative evaluations – all using control or 
comparison groups, a pre-test or post-test design with random assignment, reliable 
outcome measures, and large sample sizes – found similar results (The Research 
Triangle Institute, 1994).  These findings confirm prior research on the ineffectiveness 
of DARE (Clayton, et al., 1996; 1991; Rosenbaum, et al., 1994; Dukes, Ullman, and 
Stein, 1996; McNeal and Hansen, 1995). Perhaps most troubling are recent findings that 
suggest DARE may increase drug use among participants (Rosenbaum, et al, 1998). By 
talking about the dangers of drug use, the study found that DARE may have 
inadvertently planted the idea of rebellious experimentation in the minds of some youth. 
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Thus far from scaring children away from the drug culture, the program may actually 
glamorize drug use by making it appear dangerous and forbidden. 
The mounting evidence that DARE does not work has prompted a few police 
departments to withdraw support for this program.  In 1996, the chief of police in 
Louisville, Kentucky withdrew his department’s support for this program.  DARE 
suffered the same fate two years later in Bolder, Colorado and Salem, Oregon where local 
school officials and law enforcement personnel cited the programs rigid curriculum, 
extensive time commitment, and poor results.  Other cities, such as Oakland, Omaha, 
Spokane, Washington, and Fayetteville, N.C. have also eliminated their participation in 
DARE.  For some of these officials the decision was not easy, alluding to the program’s 
“strong community support” (Sebastian, 1998). 
However, the number of cities and schools to drop DARE remain very small, and 
DARE is still the largest drug prevention program in the nation.  Signifying the 
normative symbolic pressures associated with this program, DARE officials have 
responded to the mounting evidence that their program does not work by attacking the 
motives of researchers, suggesting that their work is linked to a broader political agenda 
to legalize drugs, while embracing anecdotal testimony of participants, teachers, parents, 
and police officers who believe DARE is an effective program.  This strategy worked 
until a number of high-profile advocates of the DARE program began publishing research 
documenting the program’s shortcomings.  
However, the normative and coercive pressures to maintain the status quo are 
strong.  To date, school corporations are not willing to terminate DARE programs for fear 
of being labeled advocates of drug legalization by parents, local law enforcement 
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officials, DARE America, and state DARE commissions.  This fear has been fostered by   
anti-drug and anti-crime advocacy organizations that have rallied in support of DARE, 
accusing any school corporation that drops the program of supporting drug legalization.  
Similarly, school corporations do not want to forgo the public financial resources that are 
made available to their organizations by participating in this program.  While the total 
amount of new money made available to a school for a DARE program is small, 
continued participation in DARE is used as a signal by other public and non-profit 
funding agencies when considering the allocation of additional resources.  Together, 
these institutional pressures have prevented a coherent and systematic response by local 
school districts to the ever widening scope of  evaluation research findings that DARE is 
not effective.   
 
2. Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) 
IDAs are a policy tool designed to help low-income workers and households build 
assets and achieve upward social and economic mobility.  IDAs are matched savings 
accounts – similar to Individual Retirement Accounts.  While IDAs vary, the typical 
program restricts eligibility to those below the federal poverty line.  For many programs, 
a 3-1 match is typical.  That is, for every dollar saved by an IDA participant, a match of 
three dollars is made.  The amount of matched savings for any given IDA participant is 
usually capped, so that the match will only occur for savings up to a given level.  
Typically, the savings accrued in IDAs can only be used for post-secondary education 
and training, business capitalization, or a down payment on the purchase of a home. 
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IDAs were first conceived in the late 1980s and early 1990s as an alternative to 
public welfare programs that typically increase short-term income but have no impact on 
long-term wealth accumulation (Sherraden, 1991).  Since wealth (not income) is thought 
to be responsible for explaining variation in life-chances (Conley, 1999), IDAs were 
thought to be an effective means of encouraging savings and subsequent wealth creation 
by subsidizing the savings of the poor. The concept of IDAs is closely aligned with 
several aspects of the American belief system that emphasize savings, education, 
homeownership, and entrepreneurship.  IDAs posses a strong normative element in that 
they are perceived to encourage participants to engage in behavior that is in keeping with 
cherished ideals of economic self-sufficiency and personal uplift via hard work.  
Advocates of IDAs emphasize the importance of this policy tool as a devise that can 
make the “American dream” a reality for all citizens, including the poorest of the poor.  
Hence, the normative pressures on policy makers, including important philanthropic and 
non-profit sector actors, to support IDAs are powerful.  In essence, support for this policy 
tool acted as a symbolic endorsement for support of the American dream that everyone 
has a chance to be a success.    
 Initial adoption of IDAs began on a piecemeal basis.  Large philanthropic 
organizations, such as the Ford Foundation, began funding small-scale IDA programs 
that would be operated by non-profit social service providers where part of the grant 
funds would be used to match participants’ savings.  As these initial programs unfolded 
and gained some publicity, other philanthropic organizations began to advance this 
programmatic concept, encouraging grant applicants to propose similar initiatives.  
Within a very short period of time, many of the nation’s 3,500 community development 
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corporations and countless other social service agencies were responding to requests for 
proposals and new grant initiatives that sought to replicate existing IDA programs.  
The widespread adoption of IDAs occurred without much support from the public 
sector.  That is, governments did not place much pressure on non-profits to implement 
these initiatives.  While a few small government programs were implemented that 
borrowed on the IDA concept, they were the exception, not the rule, and did not represent 
anything near full scale IDA implementation.  For instance, starting in the early 1990s, 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development initiated the Family Self Sufficiency 
Program.  This initiative tries to foster economic mobility among Section 8 participants 
via an escrow account.  Payments to these accounts occur when a participants’ income 
would increase, resulting in an increase in rent.  The marginal increase in rent is set-aside 
in an escrow account – with no match – that can be used by participants for expenses 
related to education and training, business capitalization, and homeownership.  
In more recent years, the federal government has given states more flexibility to 
utilize federal welfare dollars to implement IDA programs.  In particular, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 authorizes states to 
create IDA programs with TANF block grant funds and to disregard all money saved in 
IDAs in determining eligibility for all means-tested government assistance. All deposits 
into the IDAs are limited to earned income. States currently providing IDAs for TANF 
recipients in their state plans are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, and Washington. However, it is important to note that states are neither required 
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to use TANF funds to create IDA programs nor penalized for failing to do so.  In short, 
the coercive pressures to adopt IDA are relatively low.   
The decision by these states (as well as other non-governmental organizations) to 
embrace IDAs is not the result of independent, rigorous social science evaluations that 
have shown this policy tool to be effective.  After all, the evaluation literature on IDAs is 
almost non-existent.  A few small-scale assessments of specific IDA initiatives have been 
done, but none have utilized rigorous evaluation methods, such as random assignment or 
comparison groups.  The absence of rigorous evaluation research on IDAs is, in part, by 
design.  Foundations that fund IDA evaluations have at times refused to disseminate the 
work to researchers unless the results are positive. 
 
3. YouthBuild 
YouthBuild is a youth and community development program that offers job 
training, education, counseling, and leadership development to hard-to-employ youth and 
high school drop-outs, between 16-24 years old, through the construction and 
rehabilitation of affordable housing in their own communities.  Participants are trained in 
the construction trades, on a 12-month cycle, and the affordable housing developed 
through their efforts is typically owned and managed by community-based organizations, 
including community development corporations.   
YouthBuild began in 1978 as a part of the Youth Action Program – a non-profit, 
community based organization – in East Harlem.  Initially, this initiative was designed to 
improve the lives of hard-to-employ youth by training them with basic life skills and job 
skills through the construction of affordable housing in poor Harlem neighborhoods.  
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Funding for the two New York sites would come from a combination of municipal and 
philanthropic grants.  
While YouthBuild was able to generate local interest and support for its initial 
sites, it was unable to distinguish itself from the large number of youth and community 
development programs operating across the nation.  For many government and 
philanthropic funding agencies, YouthBuild was perceived as one program among 
countless others with a similar mission.  Funding agencies interested in supporting youth 
and community development programs could express their support for such efforts in a 
variety of ways – whether or not they supported YouthBuild.  
In order to improve the visibility and position of YouthBuild among the many 
youth and community programs across the nation, a coalition of local non-profit 
organizations was formed in 1988 to pursue a strategy of national replication.  This 
coalition attempted to expand this program beyond New York City, address the programs 
slow and episodic replication in other sites, and develop a strategy to achieve these goals. 
These efforts eventually succeeded with the power and persuasion that government 
funding carries.   
YouthBuild experienced dramatic growth in the mid-1990s with the support of 
two federal agencies.  In 1992, Congress passed the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1992.  Title D (“Hope for Youth”) of this law included funds for 
programs like YouthBuild.  Between 1993 and 1997, the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development awarded $158 million to fund YouthBuild programs.  In 
addition, the Corporation for National and Community Service selected YouthBuild USA 
as a national-direct grantee to develop YouthBuild AmeriCorps programs in six 
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communities, including funds for education awards (scholarships) to YouthBuild 
graduates. YouthBuild has also received substantial financial support from the 
philanthropic sector.  The Ford Foundation, the Lilly Endowment, the Charles Stewart 
Mott Foundation, and the DeWitt Wallice-Readers Digest Fund have all made substantial 
investments in this initiative.  This level of financial support would result in the 
development of over 100 YouthBuild sites in over 90 cities across 35 states, involving 
more than 3,500 participants.  
The federal government’s endorsement of this program had a ripple effect.  It 
spurred philanthropic investments, while also prompting state and local governments 
interested in accessing these resources to import the YouthBuild program to their cities 
and communities.  For those places with large numbers of hard-to-employ youth, access 
to these resources was critical, given the general scarcity of public funds for programs to 
help this population.  As a result, local and state governments were quick to embrace 
YouthBuild. 
Currently, YouthBuild programs operate in a decentralized environment.  Each 
site is responsible for securing its own funding and managing its operation.  YouthBuild 
providers are connected through YouthBuild USA Affiliated Network – a non-profit 
organizational association of YouthBuild providers.  This association provides technical 
assistance to specific YouthBuild providers and is charged with the continued 
development and replication of this program.   
Expansion of the YouthBuild program occurred without any rigorous independent 
research assessing its impact.  In brief, it was scaled-up to the national level with public 
funds even though there was no evidence demonstrating the program worked, or that it  
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represented an improvement over existing youth workforce development programs, such 
as the JobCorp.  A subsequent evaluation has been conducted (Ferguson and Clay, 1996).  
This research followed 177 YouthBuild participants, measuring labor market and 
educational attainment outcomes, as well as behavior measures related to time 
management, leadership proclivity, and substance use.  These results indicate that 17 
percent dropped out of the program, while 38 percent of participants in the study went on 
to full-or part-time employment, school, or training.  Of those who were employed after 
completing the YouthBuild program, 66 percent went into construction related jobs at an 
average wage of $7.60 per hour.  Of those who were employed in non-construction 
related jobs, the average wage was $6.80 per hour.  Unfortunately, this evaluation did not 
use random assignment or a comparison group, making it impossible to determine 
whether these outcomes are the result of YouthBuild or represent labor market outcomes 
that would have occurred without the YouthBuild intervention.  Moreover, it is unclear 
whether these outcomes represent an improvement over other youth workforce 
development programs. 
In spite of the limited evaluation research on YouthBuild, the federal 
government’s endorsement of this program has forced local officials to adopt the program 
if they want to expand or enhance their youth workforce development programs.  As a 
result, YouthBuild remains an unproven program where local support is largely the result 
of federal government pressure to adopt this initiative.   
 
 
III.  Rethinking the Context of Public Sector Contracting 
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 These three cases provide a glimpse of the variation in the type and extent of 
institutional pressure brought to bear on public managers.  As summarized in the table 
below, each example varies by the extent of institutional pressure that was present at the 
time of adoption and subsequent expansion.   The three types of institutional pressures --  
normative, mimetic, and coercive -- capture the range of institutional pressures that may 
influence the adoption and expansion of public programs that are managed and 
implemented by nonprofit organizations.  
 
 
Type of  
Institutional 
Pressure 
 
 
Drug Abuse 
Resistance 
Education  (DARE) 
 
Individual  
Development 
Accounts (IDA) 
 
 
YouthBuild 
 
Normative 
 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Mimetic 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
 
Coercive 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
 
 DARE represents an example of where all three dimensions of institutional 
pressure are high.  Among local school administrators and law enforcement officials, a 
strong normative commitment to preventing drug use and subsequent crime was an 
important aspect of this program’s genesis and adoption in our nation’s school system.  
Other like-minded professionals from across the nation, with a shared concern for these 
issues, were quick to embrace DARE as a logical policy response.  Moreover, schools 
and local law enforcement agencies were quick to adopt DARE so as to signal a shared 
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belief with the public that drugs and drug use are bad.   Reluctance to send such a signal 
might label a school or local law enforcement agency as a supporter of drug legalization. 
These strong normative pressures were accompanied by high-levels of coercive 
and mimetic institutional forces.  The primary coercive pressure involved the passage of 
federal legislation in 1986 mandating schools to implement a comprehensive drug 
prevention program.  Since schools were compelled by government to deliver these 
initiatives, many schools were faced with the uncertainty of not knowing whether 
substance abuse prevention programs worked or whether the type of program offered 
would produce different results.   This level of uncertainty generated substantial mimetic 
pressure among local school officials to import an existing program.  Many school 
officials simply turned to the most visible initiative at the time – DARE. Together, these 
high levels of institutional pressure surrounding the DARE program forced its 
widespread adoption even though there was no systematic evidence to suggest it was 
effective.  Moreover, the persistence of these institutional pressures has made it almost 
impossible for this program to be dismantled even though very rigorous evaluations 
suggest it is ineffective.  
Much like DARE, IDAs also evolved out of high normative and mimetic 
pressures; however the nature of these pressures was slightly different.  The push to adopt 
IDAs grew out of the desire among social service professionals to create a vehicle for 
assisting poor families generate wealth.  Administering in-cash income support programs 
were perceived as a necessary (but not sufficient) response to poverty, since they did not 
provide a basis for helping poor families become upwardly mobile.  They prevented 
material hardship without offering a means to achieve self-sufficiency.  In order to 
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address this perceived deficiency, IDAs were slowly embraced among social service 
professionals.   
The mimetic pressure surrounding IDAs were rooted in the common position of 
many social service agencies and other local community-based organizations with limited 
resources who were looking for ways to at least symbolically send signals to clients that 
they (as an organization) had a policy or program that could help clients achieve upward 
mobility.  Adopting these programs would also send signals to potential funders that 
these organizations were in the business of changing peoples’ lives rather than 
maintaining the status quo.  Since IDAs could be implemented on a very small scale, 
potentially affecting a few hand-picked participants, many social service agencies and 
community-based organizations adopted this policy. 
One substantial difference between DARE and IDAs is the level of coercive 
institutional pressure.  At the moment, there is no federal law that requires states or 
localities to operate IDA programs.  Since 1996, states may use welfare block-grant 
money to pay for IDA programs but there is no requirement to do so. This level of 
institutional pressure has resulted in fairly widespread replication of IDA programs even 
though there is no clear evaluation research demonstrating its success.  This process of 
replication has occurred from pressures within social service organizations and several 
philanthropic funders, but unlike DARE, has not been forced on non-profit managers and 
local government administrators by federal mandate. 
In contrast, YouthBuild has expanded on an incremental basis, fueled largely by 
coercive pressures but without strong normative or mimetic pressures.  To be more 
specific, there was nothing that differentiated YouthBuild from the thousands of other 
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similar workforce development programs for teenagers scattered across the nation.  While 
normative pressures were present among non-profit organizations and others involved in 
workforce development issues to fund programs that would help disadvantaged youth 
enter the labor market, there were no unique forces at play within these organizations to 
explain why YouthBuild would have gained an advantage.  Similarly, mimetic pressures 
were also low.  However, the coercive pressures imposed by the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development’s endorsement of this initiative (without any evidence 
that it worked) caused the program to grow incrementally across the nation.  
In the end, institutional pressures played very different shaping the 
implementation of the three programs examined here. In each instance, these pressures 
significantly shaped the pattern of implementation that was followed and set the context 
within which evaluation research was or was not used to inform contracting. Of course, 
the idea of making a link between evaluation research and decision making is appealing. 
It holds out the possibility that public management can actually improve over time as 
knowledge is translated into action. What we have argued here is that institutional 
pressures can and do shape the meaning and implications of evaluation research and 
make it difficult for public managers to establish a strong link between information and 
action. In some cases, like DARE, this has led to vast amounts of resources being 
expended on a program that almost most research indicates simply does not work. In 
other cases, like IDAs, program replication has proceeded largely ahead of the analysis of 
evaluation research. 
While it is tempting to focus only on what public agencies do well and the 
programs they implement that work best, we believe that greater attention, both in the 
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form of further empirical and theoretical work, needs to be directed at cases of failures, 
where decision making breaks down and where programmatic results are disappointing. 
Only by shifting the focus from “what works” to “what does not work” is it likely that 
researchers will be able to develop useful diagnostic tools for managers that can help 
them improve in their work. A key starting point, we believe, is the greater application of 
institutional thinking to public administration. Too long separated from the best ideas in 
organization theory (Rainey, 1997), public administration theory can be enriched by 
further pursuing points of intersection with the broader literature on organizations. One 
insight we have highlighted here that emerges at this point of contact is the need to focus 
on the overlooked challenge of managing the institutional pressures around public 
agencies, pressures that incline these agencies toward institutional isomorphism. 
Beyond opening itself up to new theoretical inputs, public administration, in 
general, and contracting theory in particular, needs to move beyond the single-minded 
focus on the importance of information to good policy making. Sound contracting 
involves not just having good evaluation research to guide action, but also an 
environment in which institutional pressures are minimized so that information can be 
processed and used meaningfully. Without focusing on ways of controlling the tendencies 
of public agencies toward isomorphism, even the best evaluation research will be unable 
to inform decision making.  
Putting public managers into the fourth position (see Figure 1), i.e. operating with 
good evaluation data and amidst low institutional pressures, requires a fair amount of 
work and vigilance, both in collecting data and shielding the decision making process 
from professional peer pressure, the inclination toward mimesis, and the power of 
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coercion from funders at higher levels of government. A critical first step in claiming this 
fourth option for public managers is creating and preserving high levels of independence 
and autonomy. Only when public managers are shielded to some extent from the forces 
pulling them in countless directions will they be in a position to make good use of 
evaluation research and make the link between data and decision making. In this sense, 
the institutional approach to public administration requires a radical rethinking of the 
meaning and form that accountability and oversight should take in the public sector. It 
may just be that the only way to improve the link between information and action is to 
shield public managers from some of the many external forces that pull and push them in 
their decision making. Loosening networks and reducing control from higher levels of 
government will not be easy, but the payoff in terms of more grounded decision making 
and wiser sterwardship of public resources could be significant. If institutional theory 
were to force public administration to explore these issues more fully, its contribution to 
practice would be lasting and important indeed. 
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